The Meme Machine by Susan Blackmore
an eclectic and stimulating analysis |
I
was captivated when, years ago, I read Richard Dawkins's incantation of the concept of a meme. In his seminal book, The Selfish Gene, he introduced the concept of a meme late in the piece to offer a distinction between the human option to propagate one's genes, albeit only as the vessel of these genes propelled by the blind hand of natural selection, by murder, plunder, rapine and theft, and the option to propagate one's ideas across the generations, ostensibly a stronger personification of the individual that a strand of digitally coded DNA. I remember Isaac Newton's genes, now considerably diluted (two to the power of however many generations), and the success of his theories, offered as an example. Blackmore uses the definition that a meme is a unit of imitation, a replicator. Her book is a surprisingly warm, given the abstract nature of the topic, and eclectic survey of the literature to toss around many views and arguments, with ambitious and cogent conclusions offered. While this is the review in a nutshell, I think it embodies a sufficiently important theory that I have included a closer account for any who are interested. The chapter on universal Darwinism strengthens the definition by examining how memes and genes evolve, making the case for a theory of memetics. Blackwell then reviews the evolution of culture. In considering human behaviour, she teases apart genetic and memetic selection and commences the main thesis of the book to show that both replicators are needed to explain the evolution of culture. There has been excellent work around this work before and since, notably by EO Wilson, but Blackwell's arguments are incisive. "Taking a meme's eye view" takes the fuzziness out of our perception of a meme. It explains classical and operant learning and shows how these are not memetic. It shows that imitation is in fact "rare and special", driving home the point that a meme or any evolutionary process is subject to three conditions: heredity, variation and selection. Blackmore's discussion inevitably leads to fundamental challenges to the meme concept. In "Three problems with memes", she first addresses the fundamental unit of a meme. Her analogies such as the first four notes of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony and the whole symphony, and the codon and the gene complex in genetic coding, quickly negate this as a problem. Identification of the mechanism for copying and storing memes is relegated to being less a problem to being less a problem for which a solution may be better refined with study. The charge that memetic evolution is 'Lamarkian' is dealt with by challenging too close an analogy between memes and genes, and suggesting that the distinction between 'copying the instructions' and 'copying the product' is helpful basis to identifying memes. This rebuttal by Blackmore prompts a discussion of terminology and a presentation of the confusing views by experts on issues such as genotype and phenotype, vehicles and memeplexes. This is an example of the strength of Blackmore's analysis. Her extensive reading and deliberation prepares her to make summary judgements in these matters, in this case arguing for simplicity. Her plea that this will provide a basis for study and useful work in an emerging science is consistent with her acknowledgement that refinements and definitions may follow this study. |
The
advantages of imitation are framed as a selective driver for "The big brain", offering a memetic evolutionary model that remains in step with more recent thinking, as do Blackmore's arguments for imitation driving language. She considers many perspectives - some oddly subjective, such as the putative benefits to society of gossip - to argue that human language is meme-driven, and language in turn spreads memes. There is a sound purpose in making this assertion because we can then use memetic models with their fidelity, fecundity and longevity to analyse the merits of languages. Blackmore then measures up "The limits of sociobiology" and meme theory. Her arguments are boosted by the elegance of Dennett's Tower and show the strong selective powers of imitation. "An orgasm saved my life" drives home many of the points and I am keen to find a review, even a rebuttal, of her points by, for example, E O Wilson. There is no doubt that Blackmore's easy style may encourage credulity. Her arguments for the divergence of sexual lifestyles beyond those favoured by the selfish gene ring true. "The memetic theory of altruism" puts the pieces of the argument together well. The tit-for-tat strategy is convincing, although I feel that Blackmore could have moved beyond genetic and memetic drivers to also consider the basic philanthropic logic of charitable acts that motivates many practitioners. Nevertheless, the use of memetics to explain and, as a science, predict behaviour is convincing, none less that in considering "Memes of the new age" where Blackmore touches on areas in which she is expert such as the psychology of alien abduction, near-death experiences and fortune telling. A lot of thinking on "Religion as memeplexes" has occurred since this publication, most of it in step with Blackmore's. Similarly, the role of communication in meme replication has been justified as the internet has rolled out and become all but omnipotent in our lives. In the final two chapters, "The ultimate memeplex" and "Out of the Meme race", Blackmore rambles around a few ambitious arguments, debating Dennett and searching for greater meaning. Whether thanks to her arguments or just the ideas she brought to the table, it is intriguing and feels right to consider the self and consciousness as evolving memeplexes. |